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The Politics of Corporate Alien          
Tort Cases 
Chimène I. Keitner∗ 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides U.S. federal courts with subject 
matter jurisdiction over violations of certain universally recognized 
international legal norms.1  In recent years, courts have confronted cases 
brought under the ATS against accomplices to international law violations 
(as opposed to direct perpetrators), and against corporations (as opposed to 
individuals).  The paradigmatic corporate alien tort case seeks money 
damages for injuries caused by a multinational corporation’s provision of 
assistance that had a substantial effect on the perpetration of an international 
law violation, with knowledge that the assistance would have such an effect.  
The recipient of that assistance (generally a foreign government or 
paramilitary organization) is often immune from suit or otherwise beyond 
the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  However, under certain 
circumstances, the provision of assistance itself violates international law 
and may therefore give rise to subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. 
Since juridical entities, including both states and corporations, are not 
themselves literally capable of acting, courts must determine what rules to 
use to attribute the conduct of individual human beings to these juridical 
entities.  When an individual acts, legal responsibility might be borne solely 
by the juridical entity, both by the juridical entity and the individual, or 
solely by the individual.  For example, various forms of corporate 
organization may serve to shield individuals from legal responsibility for 
certain debts acquired or actions performed in the name of the corporate 
entity.  At the same time, just as corporations do not always shield 
individuals from legal responsibility, individual officials have increasingly 
been recognized as sharing concurrent legal responsibility with states for 
certain internationally unlawful conduct.  On a literal level, rules regulating 
conduct always govern the behavior of individuals because only individuals 
can actually act.  Rules of attribution determine the allocation of legal 
responsibility for an individual’s conduct, and other rules (such as those 
governing jurisdiction and immunities) determine whether a particular 
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 1.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).  
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domestic or international tribunal can adjudicate the lawfulness of that 
conduct and impose legal consequences on the individual, the juridical 
entity, or both.  U.S. courts confronting ATS cases must often identify and 
apply these various kinds of rules. 
Some large corporations rival states for their capacity to affect the lives 
of individuals around the world.  Those concerned with protecting and 
promoting individual well-being have thus naturally focused on the behavior 
of individuals acting on behalf of corporations, in addition to the behavior of 
individuals acting on behalf of states.  This focus has spread to the realm of 
ATS litigation.  At least two key features distinguish corporate ATS cases 
from those brought against individual perpetrators of international law 
violations who enter U.S. territory.  First, in terms of shaping behavior, the 
goal of these corporate cases is not to deter individual human rights violators 
from entering or remaining in U.S. territory; rather, their behavioral goal is 
to deter individuals acting on behalf of corporations from engaging in certain 
forms of harmful conduct in countries whose own judicial systems are often 
ill-equipped to regulate such conduct.  Second, because multinational 
corporations generally have assets that are within the reach of U.S. 
enforcement jurisdiction, corporate ATS cases have been defended much 
more vigorously than many of the earlier cases brought against individual 
defendants.  They have thus generated greater controversy among 
constituencies concerned about impunity for harmful conduct, on the one 
hand, and the distortionary effects of excessive liability on the other. 
Judges adjudicating corporate ATS cases are certainly aware of these 
debates.  In theory, their role is to apply governing doctrine to the allegations 
at hand, leaving it to the legislature to modify that doctrinal framework if 
necessary in light of its policy consequences.  In practice, as in many areas 
of the law, this division of labor is more easily articulated than achieved.  In 
part because of the terse nature of the ATS itself, certain judicial 
interpretations may appear to be driven largely by exogenous policy 
considerations. 
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided two issues of importance to the 
future of corporate ATS cases: the standard for aiding and abetting liability, 
and the availability of ATS jurisdiction over corporate defendants, as 
opposed to natural persons.  The questions of accessorial liability and 
corporate liability are often, although not necessarily, intertwined.2  In the 
Second Circuit, the same three-judge panel (consisting of Chief Judge 
Jacobs, Judge Cabranes, and Judge Leval) answered both questions.  In 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the members of the 
panel agreed that, under international law, corporations are only liable for 
aiding and abetting an international law violation if they provide substantial 
assistance to the principal tortfeasor with the purpose of facilitating the 
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underlying offense.3  The plaintiffs in that case alleged that Talisman 
knowingly aided and abetted an armed campaign of ethnic cleansing against 
the non-Muslim Sudanese living in the area of Talisman’s oil concession in 
southern Sudan.  The Second Circuit dismissed their claims, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied review. 
Although there remains some room for interpretation in establishing a 
defendant’s “purpose” going forward, the Talisman decision is widely 
perceived as narrowing the category of accomplices who can be held liable 
under the ATS.  This is particularly true given the obstacles to evidence-
gathering in many of the situations out of which ATS cases arise, which may 
further complicate efforts to establish a defendant’s purpose.4  The Talisman 
standard arguably presents a higher threshold for claims against individuals 
and corporations for aiding and abetting international law violations than 
existed under previous case law.5 
Talisman was argued on the same day and before the same panel as 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case involving support allegedly 
provided by a Nigerian subsidiary of Shell to the Nigerian government’s 
violent suppression of protests against oil exploration and development 
activities in the Ogoni region of the Niger Delta.6  The question of whether 
corporations are appropriate defendants in ATS cases—that is, whether the 
conduct of individual directors, officers, and employees can appropriately be 
attributed to a corporation for the purpose of imposing legal consequences 
on the corporation under the ATS—was not briefed in Kiobel.  However, 
Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes focused on this question in their 
majority opinion.  They held that the absence of corporate criminal liability 
under customary international law means that ATS suits against corporations 
(as opposed to their individual officers, directors, and employees) cannot 
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proceed.7  Judge Leval, concurring in the result, would have dismissed the 
claims in Kiobel under the standard for aiding and abetting liability 
established in Talisman, while preserving the possibility of ATS cases 
against corporations for conduct that meets the Talisman standard. 
The majority found the absence of international criminal tribunals with 
jurisdiction over corporations significant in determining the scope of civil 
jurisdiction under the ATS.  This is because the ATS gives U.S. federal 
courts subject matter jurisdiction over violations of international law.  The 
majority reasoned that U.S. courts can only have jurisdiction over 
corporations under the ATS if corporations themselves are universally 
recognized as being capable of violating customary international law.  For 
Judge Leval, by contrast, the absence of an established practice among 
international tribunals of holding corporations liable for international law 
violations does not preclude U.S. courts from doing so as a matter of 
domestic law. 
My own approach would be to ask whether the attribution of individual 
conduct to a corporate entity for the purpose of ascribing legal liability is a 
“conduct-regulating rule.”8  If it is, then the question is properly governed by 
international law.  If it is not (which is my inclination), then domestic law 
properly supplies the answer.  Under this approach, international law 
supplies the elements of the violation, including both the elements of the 
underlying offense (such as genocide) and the elements of accessorial 
liability (such as aiding and abetting).  Domestic law supplies other 
elements, such as the rules for attributing conduct of the corporation’s (and 
its foreign subsidiaries’) directors, officers, and employees to the corporation 
for the purpose of legal liability. 
The question then arises: Whose domestic law?  With respect to most 
matters, the answer will be the law of the forum state.  The ATS represents 
an exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction, not prescriptive jurisdiction 
(because the conduct-regulating rules are supplied by international law).  
Seen in this light, it seems that the most interesting questions raised by 
corporate ATS cases have yet to be explored, including how the concept of 
corporate personhood operates when litigation involves the intersection of 
international laws governing individual conduct and domestic laws 
governing the attribution of that conduct to juridical entities. 
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a rehearing by the panel 
on the question of corporate liability.  Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge 
Cabranes each wrote a separate concurring opinion denying the motion for 
rehearing, and Judge Leval responded in dissent.  While Chief Judge Jacobs 
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commended the “scholarly force” of Judge Leval’s original opinion, he also 
emphasized the need to “subject Judge Leval’s conclusion to some tests of 
reality.”9  In particular, he expressed concern that, if Talisman were the only 
obstacle to corporate ATS cases, attempts by plaintiffs to “plead around” 
Talisman could “delay dismissal of ATS suits against corporations,” and that 
“the invasive discovery that ensues could coerce settlements that have no 
relation to the prospect of success on the ultimate merits.”10  This brutally 
honest account of Chief Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns prompted responses 
from both of his colleagues.  Judge Leval seized the opportunity to criticize 
the majority for “arrogat[ing] to itself a power [to make foreign and 
domestic policy] that might appropriately be exercised by the Congress or by 
the Executive Branch, but does not properly belong to the courts.”11  Judge 
Cabranes, intent on reclaiming the mantle of judicial agnosticism with 
regard to matters of policy, insisted that the Kiobel majority’s distinction 
between juridical persons and natural persons was dictated by “fidelity to the 
law, not a ‘policy agenda.’”12  Judge Cabranes’s disclaimer seems premised 
on the notion that law and policy are distinct categories, and that the 
legitimacy of judicial opinions depends on remaining firmly within the 
closed domain of “the law.”  Although doctrinal arguments are generally 
substantively distinguishable from policy arguments, law and policy (and, 
hence, politics, which involves contestation among policy choices) are 
deeply intertwined.  In acknowledging this, Chief Judge Jacobs helped to 
move the judicial discussion more explicitly towards weighing the social 
costs and benefits of corporate ATS cases.  It remains unclear, however, 
whether federal judges are either empowered or equipped to do this 
weighing. 
Ultimately, the political branches bear responsibility for weighing 
competing considerations and developing a regulatory framework (or lack 
thereof) that takes into account multiple intersecting policy goals.  In the 
meantime, federal judges will continue to grapple with the implications of 
corporate ATS cases in their courtrooms.  In so doing, they should be wary 
of modifying doctrine in response to policy considerations in corporate ATS 
cases that could have unintended negative consequences for ATS cases 
against individuals, or for other cases involving the interpretation and 
application of international law. 
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The impulse to use litigation as a tool for effectuating social change is 
engrained in U.S. legal culture.  That said, advocates concerned with 
modifying future corporate behavior might achieve better overall outcomes 
by focusing on strategies beyond ATS litigation.  Advocates concerned with 
seeking reparations for past misconduct might increasingly seek to do so, 
when possible, in the courts of the state where the misconduct occurred, 
rather than in U.S. courts.  To the extent that other countries’ courts become 
more involved in adjudicating alleged corporate complicity in international 
law violations, the emphasis in U.S. courtrooms might shift from questions 
of jurisdiction and justiciability to questions of recognition and enforcement.  
It will be interesting to see whether U.S. judges who have emphasized the 
importance of foreign remedies for foreign harms are more willing to 
enforce judgments rendered abroad against U.S. corporations than they have 
been to issue such judgments themselves. 
 
